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REACTIVE ATTITUDES, RELATIONSHIPS, AND ADDICTION 
 




What happens to close relationships of love and friendship in addiction? How does the impact of 
addiction on those relationships affect the addicted person’s view of themselves and of their 
capacities for change and recovery? In this chapter, we focus on the structure of close personal 
relations and diagnose how these relationships are disrupted by addiction. We draw upon Peter 
Strawson’s landmark paper ‘Freedom and Resentment’ (2008, first published 1962) to argue that 
loved ones of those with addiction veer between, (1) reactive attitudes of blame and resentment 
generated by disappointed expectations of goodwill and reciprocity, and (2) the detached 
objective stance from which the addicted person is seen as less blameworthy but also as less fit 
for ordinary interpersonal relationships. We examine how these responses, in turn, shape the 
addicted person’s view of themselves, their character and their capacities, and provide a negative 
narrative trajectory that impedes recovery. We close with a consideration of how these effects 
might be mitigated by adopting less demanding variations of the participant stance.  
 
Psychological visibility, self-knowledge, and interpretation 
 
As social, embodied creatures we build our view of ourselves through physical and social 
interactions and through the interpretive practices that characterise different social relationships. 
Our interactions with inanimate physical objects, for example, can reveal and develop in us a 
variety of qualities, e.g. the strength to lift an object or the agility to climb over it. Our 
interactions with other animals, such as pets, who can respond to our intentions and attitudes go 
further than this by rendering us psychologically visible to ourselves, e.g. as threatening, playful, 
or affectionate - as possessing certain personal qualities, capacities and temperament (Branden 
1993). Psychological visibility, however, is largely a function of our interactions with other 
human agents and the feedback that those interactions provide. Consider first the multitude of 
trivial and complex interactions that fill our day. We buy bus tickets, go through the supermarket 
checkout, greet colleagues, run meetings, ask for or provide directions, send texts, update our 
status on social media, order coffee. Through these interactions and the responses of others to us 
within them, we gain information both about what we are like and what is expected of us.  
 Much of this information is revealed via the other’s range of emotional reactions to us: a 
yawn suggests I am boring, while a hurt expression might reveal that I was rude. Such responses 
may challenge or confirm the view we have of ourselves. I thought my joke was funny but others 
see it as lame. I thought I was being admirably blunt but I am coming across as rude and 
arrogant. Where there is a mismatch between the view we have of ourselves and the view we get 
through others eyes we might try to reconcile them in number of ways. I might modify my 
behaviour and responses so that you will see me the way I wish to be seen. Your raised eyebrow 
response to my miserly tip might trigger shame and prompt me to be more generous next time. In 
doing so, I bring my behaviour into line with the person I want to be, or at least with prevailing 
social norms. Alternatively, I might challenge or dismiss your interpretation of me. In one-off 
interactions perhaps this is easily done (she just can’t take a joke) but, in interactions over time, a 
consistently negative response from others will be hard to ignore. Then I might internalise the 
other’s view of me. If I come to see myself as clumsy in word or deed I will likely not attempt 
tasks that require finesse or dexterity. If I see myself as boring I may be less inclined to engage 
socially for fear of rejection. If I have a stigmatized social identity – e.g. that of an addict – the 
range of interactions available to me narrows and the negative feedback, even in casual 
interactions, becomes consistent. This also can have profound effects on my agency - my view of 
what I can do and how I can do it.  
 
The participant stance, the reactive attitudes, and effective agency 
 
Peter Strawson (2008) has pointed out the very great importance that we place on the attitudes of 
others in our interactions with them. In particular, Strawson focuses on a subset of our emotional 
reactions to each other that specifically communicate our moral expectations – the reactive 
attitudes. We expect people to act towards us with goodwill; when they do, we respond with 
gratitude and with forgiveness for unintentional harms. When they violate those expectations, we 
respond with resentment and hurt feelings. The reactive attitudes are, on this account, central to 
praise and blame. When we are prepared to expose others to the reactive attitudes we take what 
Strawson calls the ‘participant stance’ towards them. 
 Adults, he suggests, take the participant stance by default because they assume each other 
to be morally responsive and responsible agents capable of adjusting their behaviour and 
attitudes in the light of the demand for goodwill and the feedback on their behaviour provided 
within this stance.i They must assume that is, that other has the set of agential capacities 
associated with autonomy, notably for moral understanding, self-reflection and self-control. The 
participant stance thus helps render the agent morally visible to herself as an equal moral agent 
and a member of the moral community and subject to mutual obligations within it. Specific 
instances of reactive attitudes help her to learn about her particular qualities that have a moral 
valence, such as degrees of generosity, trustworthiness, and consideration of others. Unexpected 
reactive attitudes, alert her to the fact that she has lost control of a moral aspect of her 
appearance. When the reactions of others are as the agent expects, they allow her to proceed with 
confidence because they indicate that she appears as she hoped to. 
 By contrast, we adopt what Strawson calls the ‘objective stance’ when the other’s actions 
are consistently unmodified by our responses to them. We come to believe that they are 
incapable of ordinary adult relationships either because they lack the relevant agential capacities 
or refuse to exercise them. Strawson gives the example of the ‘hopeless schizophrenic’ (2008, 8), 
others include those with  late stage dementia. When faced with such individuals, Strawson 
thinks we give up the disposition to resent or blame them for their harmful actions; we move, 
and should move, to the objective stance (2008, 9). From the objective stance, the other is seen as 
a problem “to be managed or handled or cured or trained; perhaps simply to be avoided” (2008, 
10). The objective attitude may involve some emotions, such as repulsion, fear and pity, but not 
“the range of reactive feelings and attitudes which belong to involvement or participation with 
others in inter-personal human relationships” (2008, 10). However, Strawson also notes that we 
may also use the objective attitude as an escape from the strain of involvement with others 
(2008, 18). Certainly it is a stance that can characterise, in particular, professional interactions 
with groups such as delinquent adolescents, or, in the present case, people who are addicted. In 
these cases, the objective attitude is damaging insofar as it limits the kind of self-visibility 
available to those targeted by it. Those targeted may come to see themselves as things to be 
managed, handled, cured, trained, feared or pitied, rather than as capable and morally responsible 
agents.  
 
Close relationships – families and friends 
 
In normal circumstances, the effects of brief negative interactions in the public sphere on identity 
and sense of agency are outweighed by positive experiences in our more intimate relationships. 
Friends and family typically provide more charitable interpretations of the agent protecting her 
against rude shopkeepers, thoughtless co-workers, distant doctors or patronising social workers. 
My clumsiness might be interpreted to me as endearing rather than irritating; my labouring a 
point is seen by those who love me as indicative of an admirably deep concern about an issue 
rather than as pedantic and boring. Furthermore, friends and family know the agent’s history and 
interact with her in various intimate situations so they can provide richer, more insightful, 
diachronic interpretations of the agent than others.ii It is therefore not surprising that friends and 
family tend to shape the agent’s self-concept more thoroughly than others do. Familial 
relationships and close friendships, however, contribute to our identities in different ways, and so 
these relationships are likely to be affected in somewhat different ways when one party develops 
an addiction.  
 We claim, following Cocking & Kennett (1998) that close friendships are marked by a 
heightened mutual receptivity to our friends’ ways of seeing us and to being directed by their 
interests. So, for example, I will typically be more open to activities that I have no antecedent 
interest in, such as going to the opera, if asked by my close friend than by my parents or a casual 
acquaintance. Similarly, we are more receptive to close friends’ interpretations of us than those 
of mere acquaintances and our friend’s interpretations and enthusiasms may encourage us to 
develop in new ways and strike out in new directions (e.g. “You have a great voice. You should 
join a choir”). Indeed, it is arguably an essential characteristic of close relationships that each 
remains responsive to a degree of shaping by the other. It is this characteristic of close friendship 
that explains the particularity and intimacy of friendship (Cocking and Kennett 1998). 
Conversely friendships become more distant and prone to the display of negative reactive 
attitudes to the extent that one or both participants feels that the other is insufficiently responsive 
to her interests and fixed in her interpretations. In such cases, the agent may feel that her friend 
no longer sees her.  
 By contrast, our identities within the family – who we are within the ‘us’ of the family – 
is less open to mutual shaping by the participants. These identities are in significant part a 
function of shared history and propinquity and, as David Velleman (2005) points out, of family 
resemblance. We inherit our family history. We grow up with our parents and siblings.  There is 
of course interpretation and direction in families, lots of it, but it tends to be guided and 
constrained by that same family history, family resemblances, and role relations within the 
family.iii Identity within the family, therefore, tends to be more fixed than in friendships. I am the 
clever one, or the sporty one, the one who can be relied upon. This is usually – where the identity 
is positive – a good thing. Family relationships provide a necessary anchor for my agency – and 
a port to which I can return – whereas friendships (especially newer ones) can provide a space 
for exploration, for the trying on of new identities and new characteristics.  
 Given the importance of these close relationships to our self-understanding, self-concept, 
and sense of efficacy, loss or damage to a close relationship can affect our agency and identity in 
multiple ways. When we lose a close relationship, we may lose a sense of who we are, of our 
place in the world and our capacities to realise our plans and achieve our goals. There is no 
guarantee, for example, that others will see me as my family member or friend does. So, if our 
relationship founders, my view of myself as feisty rather than aggressive, or as having a 
subversive sense of humour rather than being simply obscure, may be lost and my identity will 
be less robust in the face of less charitable interpretations or the social invisibility that a 
stigmatised group membership may bestow.  
 We argue that in severe cases of addiction the addicted person’s ability to play their part 
in the relationships just described may be quite limited; they may lose not one relationship but 
many, and so they are particularly vulnerable to the threats to identity, visibility, self-esteem and 
self-efficacy that the loss of relationships carry and to the imposition of a new addict identity.  
 How does addiction do this? Severe addiction is characterised by a narrowing of interests 
and attention to the pursuit and consumption of the drug of choice. Marc Lewis talks about the 
hourglass shape of addiction:  
 
“They start out unique: each person begins with his or her own specific culture, family 
environment, level of education, personality, social network, personal secrets, and all the rest. 
But then, when addiction takes hold, these lives start to look exactly the same. Regardless of 
whether it’s cocaine, opiates, alcohol, or even food, that wide range of individual differences 
shrinks to a narrow tube – the middle of the hourglass” (Lewis 2012).  
 
In the middle of the hourglass, the addicted person is not (for the most part) directly responsive 
to others’ interests or to their interpretations and has little to offer in return. They are impaired 
for forms of intimacy that require an interest in and capacity to focus upon the other person for 
their own sake, to undertake joint activities and develop joint interests. And they are unfit for 
family relationships that require fulfilling a certain role and abiding by the norms that govern the 
role – playing one’s part as a son or daughter, sibling or parent. They are no longer the sporty 
one, or the reliable one, as previous interests and pursuits are lost. Moreover, this narrowing and 
rigidifying of interests is exacerbated when they treat their friends and families instrumentally, as 
a source of money or free shelter and food, and abuse their trust. When this happens repeatedly, 
loved ones typically respond to the addicted person with anger, blame and resentment. 
Ultimately they may move to the objective stance in order to protect themselves, and the 
individualized interpretations of personality, character and actions previously offered in their 
intimate relationships may be replaced by the stereotype of the addict. We now explore in more 
detail this process and its effects.  
 
The participant stance and the shaping of self-concept in addiction 
 
As noted above, in many (but obviously not all) cases of addiction, the addicted person treats 
their friends and family poorly, making unreasonable demands for money, stealing from them, 
breaking promises, and generally acting with disregard for their interests. They thus violate the 
most basic interpersonal expectation of goodwill as well as the relational expectations of 
particularised care and concern. Friends and family initially respond from within the participant 
stance with resentment and blame – holding the addicted person responsible for their actions. 
The addicted person also often exposes his family to negative reactive attitudes when they refuse 
his demands.  
 
“He would go to my mum ‘shut up’ and then it would get to the stage he would actually lose it, 
shout and bawl. If my mum went like that, ‘right, just get out of the house’ he would shout the 
whole way down the close [tenement stairwell]… and the whole way down the street he would 
be shouting ‘ya fucking bitch’ (Sibling, Martina)” (Barnard 2007, 32). 
 
Typically, a feedback loop of resentment develops because family members resent being the 
target of the addicted person’s unreasonable resentment. It is also common for the addicted 
person to seed resentment between other family members and then subsequently be resented for 
having had that effect on the family.iv 
 
“I was very angry with them [his brothers and sisters], very resentful towards them. It works both 
ways because they become very resentful towards you. … In harming himself he was effecting 
the whole family … everyone’s emotions are all shot up… (Parent: Ms Garvey)” (Barnard 2007, 
29). 
 
Eventually the addicted person’s actions are suspected of being manipulative by default. The 
lack of trust severely limits the kinds of interactions the addicted person can have with their 
friends and family. 
 
“It’s always money, money, money. And I mean it makes me cringe when he puts his arm 
around me and he’ll say ‘I love you ma’ and I push him away because I know it’s not genuine… 
And it’s terrible to do that with… But I can’t help it. (Parent: Mrs Blain)” (Barnard 2007, 33). 
 
When an embrace with one’s mother is returned in kind, one usually becomes visible to oneself 
as someone who expresses love and is a worthy recipient of love. However, if the embrace is 
rejected, that makes one visible to oneself as someone who is not loved, someone who is 
manipulative and doesn’t express love.v  
 As the content of the addict’s self-concept becomes entrenched, the addicted person 
begins to draw on it to frame her experience and her plans.  
 
“I was worried about what other people were thinking about me and you know being an addict 
and ... I come from a good family and you know (…) I can fit in that group if I want to, but I 
know that I’m an addict (…) I think that they can see it, you know?” (Nicole).vi 
 
Once one sees oneself as an addict, that self-concept more easily makes sense of experiences that 
fit with being an addict, e.g. others seeing one as an addict. Furthermore, plans that fit with being 
an addict make more sense so that recovery seems less achievable for someone like her.vii 
 Consistent negative reactive attitudes from others also erodes belief in the effectiveness 
of one’s agency more generally and undermines self-efficacy. 
 
“People’s perception of me is so important now because I’ve ruined half of it. And I don’t deny 
that that’s my doing but to have them believe in me again is so important. And I can’t even look 
at you in the eye ‘cause I wonder if you think I’m even telling you the truth. This is how I feel ... 
I’m so scared that people are going to judge me that I don’t know whether ... what I’m saying is 
worth it or not” (Diana).viii 
 
Diana exhibits low self-esteem (I don’t know whether what I’m saying is worth it); a suspicion 
that she is seen as untrustworthy (I wonder if you think I’m telling the truth) which might belie a 
lack of self-trust; and a lack of self-respect (I can’t look you in the eye). Such negative self-
evaluations are reinforced by the negative attitudes directed at her by others and they are 
particularly detrimental because they undermine the self-authority needed for recovery and 
agency in general (Mackenzie 2014). Diana admits a role in ruining people’s perceptions of her 
but that doesn’t mean she can repair those perceptions on her own. In fact, she recognises that 
she needs others to ‘believe in her again’, to believe that she is worthy of some trust, respect, and 
esteem. If they do, they will help her to re-establish the self-authority she needs to direct her own 
recovery.  
 Exposure to negative reactive attitudes within the participant stance accelerates 
relationship difficulties as the addicted person is motivated to distance himself from negative 
reactive attitudes and the associated disvalued self-image.  
 
“You start to use and you turn your back on everybody for fear of being caught. And then you 
just become so selfish about wanting to feel better rather than … and so you turn on all your 
morals, all your principles and values, yeah” (Tom).ix 
 
The addicted agent often feels intense shame and guilt because, between periods of intoxication, 
they are well aware that their behaviour conflicts with their values and those of the people in 
their close relationships (Flanagan 2013). Because our close relationships make us particularly 
visible to ourselves, participation in these relationships will tend to elicit shame and so the 
addicted person is motivated to withdraw from them.  
 Close friends and family can often see that guilt and shame are compounding the 
problems the addicted person faces. This recognition can motivate a different reactive attitude – 
forgiveness. Forgiving involves “ceasing to have towards the wrongdoer the retributive reactive 
attitudes that her wrongdoing supports, without changing our judgments about the wrongness 
and culpability of her action. … Forgiving makes sense when our concern is with giving them a 
chance to be different in the future” (Allais 2008, 20). Therefore, forgiveness should help 
alleviate guilt and support self-forgiveness which should help alleviate shame. Indeed, 
forgiveness and self-forgiveness do seem to be important for an ultimately successful recovery 
from addiction (Weaver, Turner, and O’Dell 2000). However, it seems that, typically, 
forgiveness is unhelpful when the other is still in the neck of the hourglass of addiction.  By 
forgiving before the addicted person is ready to begin to “be different in the future”, friends and 
family set the addicted person up for failure and fresh resentment. Families may thus cycle 
between forgiveness and resentment with it becoming progressively harder to forgive each time. 
Friends who lack the ties of obligation to the addicted person may simply end the relationship as 
the addicted person fails to engage in the mutual interpretation and shaping of interests and 
concerns that are constitutive of close friendship. In summary, close relationships become more 
distant as the non-addicted parties protect themselves from the destructive behaviour of the 
addicted person and the addicted person avoids the painful self-visibility provided by friends and 
family.  
 The addicted person’s participation in their close relationships is often largely replaced 
by participation in relationships with drug-using acquaintances. This is partly pragmatic; these 
relationships help the agent secure and use drugs. However, many addicted people also report 
feeling more comfortable with these acquaintances.  
 “The only time I feel comfortable is around other drug addicts and other people who are on 
substance because they accept [me] no matter what and I’m a pretty hard person to tolerate at 
times” (Julia).x 
 
 We would expect these interactions to be more comfortable because they generate a less 
confronting self-visibility. Addicted people are less likely to expose each other to negative 
reactive attitudes for using drugs and they might be more sympathetic, understanding, resigned, 
or apathetic to behaviours that draw resentment in non-addicted circles. Despite being more 
comfortable, however, these relationships often lack an important defining feature of close 
friendship: participants in these relationships are not usually open to shaping each other in ways 
outside of their shared interest in securing and using drugs. Indeed, people trying to cease using 
drugs often report negative feedback from their drug using acquaintances. 
 
“The other addicts aren’t really...they don’t want to see someone get on with their life ‘cause 
then... oh this is what I think, then...it’s saying to them, maybe you can do this but they don’t 
want to...they’re comfortable....‘cause I notice when I’m going well, no-one’s that happy and it’s 
like no-one wants to give you a shot when you’re hanging out but when you’ve been clean for 
six months everyone wants to give you a shot” (John).xi 
 
A shift to the objective stance 
 
When an addicted person displays consistent disregard for herself and others despite resentment 
or forgiveness this appears to make her an appropriate target of the objective stance, i.e. as 
someone to be managed, handled, cured, trained or simple avoided. We certainly see examples of 
people taking the objective stance to addicted people: 
 
“Oh I know the person that’s using the drugs is not the son I had, I understand that, that’s a shell 
of the person I knew… I mean all I see is an addict, I don’t see my son anymore because I know 
that’s not my son, definitely isn’t my son” (Parent: Mr Bell) (Barnard 2007, 50). 
 
The effect of such invisibility and exclusion from social interaction on the agent’s self-authority 
is particularly severe. 
 
“You’re a drug addict person. People look to you … a different way … they judge you, they’re 
scared of you, lots of things. Different from … normal people. … You’re really low, you’re just 
like nobody” (Hien).xii 
 
Indeed, as Strawson recognises, taking the objective stance for too long is incompatible with 
human interactions. “Being human, we cannot, in the normal case, do this for long, or altogether. 
If the strains of involvement, say, continue to be too great, then we have to do something else – 
like severing a relationship” (Strawson 2008, 10). So the objective stance too, leads to a 
breakdown of the relationship and certainly to a loss of the intimacy and security that close 
relationships provide. 
 Moreover, the objective stance may be based upon and nurture the belief that the 
outcomes of addiction will be determined by something that is independent of the efforts of the 
addicted person.xiii If addiction is seen, for example, as an illness or a disease, the progress of 
which is outside the voluntary control of the addicted person then friends, family and the 
addicted person themselves should defer to the experts on treatment and management of the 
condition. . Such a view of addiction can provide relief to all parties from painful blame and 
shame but it comes at a cost both to the relationships and to recovery. In taking the objective 
attitude, the addicted person’s behaviour may be viewed entirely mechanistically – as caused by 
forces external to their agency to which they are largely helpless onlookers. But if recovery 
actually requires at least some effort from the addicted person (Pickard 2012), the objective 
stance might compound addiction by discouraging significant others from both the belief that 
such  efforts can be effective and  or that the addicted person is capable of making them. This 
leads to a sense of fatalism in their attitude towards the addicted person as they give up on the 
prospects of re-engagement and recovery. While they may continue to love their friend or family 
member they step back from more active forms of engagement.  
 
“I’d be very surprised if any of my boys get through this, now, the two that’s using. I think the 
best I can hope for is burying them… I don’t think they’ll get through this, you know, it’s been 
too long now”(Parent: Mr Merrick) (Barnard 2007, 50). 
 
 Similarly, addicted persons frequently end up adopting a resigned and fatalistic stance 
towards their lives and their addiction. (Kennett 2013) Repeated experiences of failure to live up 
to their obligations, of other’s disappointment and anger with them, and their own shame at their 
behaviour, results in a loss of confidence in their ability to exert control over their circumstances, 
to play their part, and to shape the lives they would value having and the people they would 
value being.  They become onlookers rather than participants in their own lives, sharing others’ 
bleak assessments of the likely outcome of their addiction.  We can see evidence of addicted 
people internalising the objective stance in the fatalistic stories they tell about their pasts and 
futures. When asked where he saw himself in one year’s time, one study participant said, 
“Probably exactly where I am now. Exactly where I am now.” (Howard). Another respondent 
said:  
 
“When I’m in the throes of addiction and I’m trying to stop and I can’t stop, my head’s going 
this is who you are. I can accept that you know what I mean. That’s ... as weird as that sounds I 
can accept that I’m a junkie. I’m ... my life is over and this is what I’ll be until I die. It’s the only 
way I can stop is to die” (Dan).xiv 
 
A modified stance: rebuilding relationships and resolving the dichotomy 
 
For the addicted person, the participant and objective stances present a detrimental dichotomy 
that makes maintaining relationships difficult and recovery less likely. The participant stance as 
laid out by Strawson demands a level of responsiveness to others and responsibility in 
discharging obligations that is beyond that which the addicted person can consistently achieve. 
Conversely, the objective stance assumes the other lacks the capacities needed to play their part 
in inter-personal relationships tout court, when, for the most part, addicted people retain this 
capacity to a significant extent. As Jennifer Radden notes, it is cruel and unjust to treat someone 
as having more autonomy than they do but, equally, to treat them as having less than they do 
(2002, 399). The above discussion has explained how both injustices have compounding, 
detrimental effects.  
 The mistake has been to think that engagement from within the participant stance must 
presume and require equal responsibility and capacity of the parties or else it is somehow 
defective (Kennett 2007). This is not how human relationships (or human-animal relationships) 
work. It is possible to navigate a middle path where one participates with the other in a way that 
is sensitive to their present capacities for engagement and responsiveness and so keeps the door 
of the relationship open to both parties. There are a multitude of valued ways in which we can, 
and ordinarily do, engage with and shape each other that don’t depend on particularly high levels 
of autonomy or moral responsibility. I can value your appreciation of slap-stick, your 
melodramatic involvement in watching your sports team, your ironic commitment to a brand of 
beer, your clumsiness, your warmth, your laugh, your particular facial expressions. None of these 
things depend strongly on the kinds of developed agential capacities that underwrite and justify 
the reactive attitudes of indignation and blame with which we began our discussion. We 
commonly adjust our responses and expectations in the light of facts about the other, their 
sensitivities, capacities, and so on, without abandoning the participant stance. A father for 
example chooses a slap-stick comedy rather than a political satire to watch because he is 
tailoring the activity to his son. He chooses something they can enjoy together and there is 
nothing defective about such a choice or such an interaction. Even among friends at the bar a 
similar thing can happen: if the conversation happens to drift into one person’s area of expertise 
she doesn’t hold her friends to the same standards as her colleagues (and her friends might only 
have a partial grasp of the way she is holding back).  
 In addiction-affected relationships, the potential for mutual shaping and responsiveness 
can often be improved by choosing (and limiting) times for interaction to when the addicted 
person is neither intoxicated or craving and by selecting activities that will highlight the positive 
aspects of their character and be mutually enjoyable. Perhaps mention of drug policy will set my 
friend off on a rant about his mistreatment by the state and, I suspect, this shifting of 
responsibility and associated self-pity is unhelpful in his recovery. Better to watch a movie that 
appeals to our shared sense of humour or shoot a few hoops in the backyard. Families and friends 
can try to scaffold experiences that maintain narrative threads with the pre-addicted self, draw 
upon retained skills and capacities, and connect to different possible futures, even while 
recognising the addicted person’s currently limited capacity for reciprocity. Where they do 
succeed in sharing a pleasant meal, a cup of coffee or half an hour shooting hoops that can be 
enough for that time. Each positive interaction provides positive visibility for the addicted 
person. In that moment they can see themselves as holding up their end of the relationship, as 
valued, and as loved.  
 Despite efforts to tailor the scope of the interaction appropriately, the addicted person 
might still sometimes act in blameworthy ways, particularly when they are in the neck of the 
hourglass of addiction. Furthermore, even when they have emerged from this phase and are 
seeking paths to recovery there is likely to be a history of blameworthy events that haven’t yet 
been fully resolved. In response, the non-addicted person can be tempted back towards either 
pole of the dichotomy. The objective stance would relieve them from the effort of resenting and 
may justify (or rationalise) withdrawal from the relationship. The participant stance appeals 
because it defends one’s own value as someone who deserves goodwill. It also communicates the 
hope that the other could be better and, outside of addiction, this pressure often works. 
Unfortunately, for those suffering from addiction it often asks too much of them too soon. . 
  In the face of blameworthy behaviour, perhaps we can modify the participant stance so 
that we communicate the breach of our expectations but without the negative effects of the usual 
reactive attitudes surrounding blame. This seems to be the approach that Hanna Pickard (2017) 
suggests when she distinguishes affective blame from our practices of judging and holding others 
responsible for their actions. Affective blame is the normal response in the participant stance and 
involves resentment. In practices of responsibility without blame, however, resentment is 
suspended, but the addicted person is still held to be accountable for their actions and explicitly 
seen as capable of doing better. This, Pickard argues, is essential to recovery since the addict 




The dynamic between an addicted person and their friends and family is often an important 
contributor to the chronicity of addiction. Friends and family take the participant stance by 
default and expose the addicted person to consistent resentment.  As a result, the addicted person 
suffers from guilt and shame and becomes visible to himself as a drug-user who deliberately 
treats others with ill will. As he internalises this self-concept, although he maintains his status as 
a person capable of moral responsibility, he sees himself as a bad person who is undeserving of a 
better life and for whom continued drug-use makes more sense than recovery. 
 The addicted person’s consistent irresponsiveness (if not insensitivity) to reactive blame 
and resentment may then lead friends and family to take the objective stance, treating the 
addicted person as a problem to be managed. This undermines the addicted person’s status as a 
moral equal and encourages him to develop a fatalistic self-concept at odds with any exercise of 
agency including that required for recovery. Both participant and objective stances encourage a 
mutual withdrawal from close relationships which tends to leave the addicted person with just 
their drug-using relationships. This unbalanced social environment provides few opportunities to 
develop and maintain the variety of non-drug-using identities and capacities necessary for 
recovery. 
 However, we are neither forced nor normatively required to choose between the full 
participant stance or the objective stance in our dealings with addicted people. Not all valuable 
intimate relations need to presuppose full autonomous agency and we have argued that it is 
possible to establish or maintain areas of genuine reciprocity with persons whose agency and 
social responsiveness is underdeveloped, impaired, or intermittent. This is a worthwhile 
endeavour for families and friends of addicted persons that supports the addicted person’s 
agency and self-concept while providing some protection from the worst impacts of a loved 
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i There is a considerable debate about the order of explanation in Strawson (See Todd 2016). Is 
responsibility constituted by our actual practices of praise and blame or are these practices 
appropriately constrained by features of the agent themselves? We assume the latter for the 
purposes of this chapter. 
ii Of course, the interpretations provided by friends and family are not always more accurate than 
that of others. Friends and family can develop set views of a person rooted in their shared history 
so that their interpretations are less responsive to changes in the agent. Similarly, friends and 
family may be more prone to collude with a person’s false self-image because they want to 
support her. Those less involved with the agent will be less affected by these sources of bias; 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
however, the relatively narrow, less intimate nature of their interactions with the agent prevents 
their interpretations from having a particularly pervasive influence on the agent’s self-concept. 
iii Long-running friendships also exhibit these characteristics to some extent because, here too, 
the shared history constrains how the other is prepared to see us. There may not be therefore, 
such a sharp distinction between family relationships and longer-running friendships. However, 
familial relationships involve the longest shared histories (often from birth) and are influenced 
by family traditions and expectations that predate one’s birth.  So, identities within the family are 
typically less malleable than in even our longest friendships. 
iv The addicted person may also be resented for harming the family’s reputation. The family 
becomes the target of stigma. “It is [shameful]… because some of the times she’s went in and 
she’s stole other people’s kids toys and they come up and say ‘She stole out the house.’ And you 
go out and you feel it, you see the heads going and maybe you’ll walk up and they’re going on 
‘Aw see these f’ing junkies. The bane of our life.’ (Parent: Ms Nugent)” (Barnard 2007, 30). 
v It might even suggest a self-concept of being unlovable and incapable of expressing love. That, 
more serious, psychological move is indicative of the objective stance as we explain below. 
vi From interviews conducted by Anke Snoek for the Australian Research Council funded 
Project: Addiction and Moral Identity 
vii For a detailed discussion of this phenomenon see McConnell (2016). 
viii From interviews conducted by Anke Snoek for the Australian Research Council funded 
Project: Addiction and Moral Identity 
ix From interviews conducted by Anke Snoek for the Australian Research Council funded 
Project: Addiction and Moral Identity 
x From interviews conducted by Anke Snoek for the Australian Research Council funded Project: 
Addiction and Moral Identity 
xi From interviews conducted by Anke Snoek for the Australian Research Council funded 
Project: Addiction and Moral Identity 
xii From interviews conducted by Anke Snoek for the Australian Research Council funded 
Project: Addiction and Moral Identity 
xiii In most cases, it is clear that the addicted person desires to recover and so his failure to 
consistently respond to the reactive attitudes may be seen by him and others as evidence that he 
lacks the agential capacity, not that he refuses to use that capacity. 
xiv From interviews conducted by Anke Snoek for the Australian Research Council funded 
Project: Addiction and Moral Identity 
